We should have done what we have in half the time
An economist and former civil
servant, Montek Singh Ahluwalia was a key member of the team that implemented
the 1991 reforms, which dismantled government controls that stifled industry
for four decades, unshackled the Indian economy and opened it up to the world.
Ahluwalia, who went on to serve as deputy chairman of the Planning Commission,
discusses the landmark reforms and their execution in an interview. Edited
excerpts:
It
is going to be 25 years since the watershed moment in 1991. When you look back,
what thoughts immediately come to your mind?
Indeed,
1991 was a watershed moment. The basic idea that we needed to reform our
industrial and trade policies was being discussed in the 1980s and several
important steps were taken, especially in the second half of the decade. But
they did not amount to a comprehensive blueprint for systemic reform. That is
what 1991 achieved. Within two years, India’s industrial and trade control
regime had been liberalized beyond recognition. Someone who is 45 years old
today was only 20 when those changes were made and they cannot imagine the
absurd level of controls that were in place.
A
lot of preliminary work went into the policy changes that were eventually
unveiled in July 1991. I believe the M-document authored by you during your
stint in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) was critical in defining the
contours of the new policy. Can you share the experience in drafting it and how
you came to be entrusted with the task?
We
had discussed with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the late 1980s the need for
making much bolder changes in policy and I was hopeful that he would be able to
push them if he came back into office after the general election of 1989. As it
happened, the Congress did not get a majority and V.P. Singh became the prime
minister. He retained me in the PMO and on one occasion, in a conversation with
me, he enquired why other countries in Southeast Asia were doing so much better
than us. I told him it was because they were seriously engaged in economic
reforms, whereas we were hesitant to make changes. He asked me to prepare a
paper spelling out what I thought needed to be done. The result was what came
to be called the M-document. Prime minister V.P Singh directed that the paper
be discussed in the committee of secretaries. The press got hold of it and it
was published in The Financial
Express in July 1990 and it
sparked a huge controversy but it also received support.
I
must emphasize that what I said in the paper pulled together ideas that had
been discussed in government in different contexts, but they had never been
presented as a coherent, internally consistent and mutually supportive reform
package. The V.P. Singh government soon ran into other problems, but the
internal discussion of the paper in the government helped to clarify the sort
of problems people would raise if the package ever came to be implemented.
There were different views among the secretaries at the meeting and many
recognized the logic of what was being proposed. However, both the finance
ministry and the Planning Commission were opposed to these ideas.
Fortunately,
we got a chance a year later, when (P.V.) Narasimha Rao took over (as prime
minister) and Manmohan Singh became the finance minister. We were able to put
many of the ideas into practice. In fact, in some respects, we went further in
1991, and I think it helped that we had discussed these ideas before.
Can
you relive, for our readers, the excitement of the first few months?
It
was very exciting indeed. I am writing a book about my experiences and you will
have to read my book to get the full flavour of the times, but let me just give
you a brief preview. The new government took charge in the midst of a massive
balance of payments crisis, with foreign exchange reserves down to two months
of imports. There was much talk of the possibility of a default in payments by
the government of India, which would have been a very serious development. To
avoid it, the previous government had negotiated a sale of gold. Finance
minister Yashwant Sinha was criticized for selling our “family gold”, but I
believe it was the right thing to do, given the situation we had got into. To
have defaulted would have been much worse.
It
is fair to say that no other government in India has ever taken over in a
situation as precarious. Quick action was clearly needed. Shortly after the
government took over, the government devalued the rupee in two stages, on 1
July and 3 July. Devaluation in those days used to be regarded as a sign of
mismanagement. It was very controversial, though professional economists
understood that it was necessary. I was not in the finance ministry at the
time. I was in the commerce ministry as commerce secretary, and this gave me
the opportunity to push the trade policy reforms, especially the idea of
getting rid of import licences and allowing all the earlier licensed imports,
plus the OGL (open general licence) imports to be freely imported against an
enhanced entitlement for REP (Replenishment) licences. This was an important
part of the M-document.
We
were lucky that P. Chidambaram was the minister of state in charge at the time.
It was his first economic assignment, but he took very little time to
understand the complex issues involved and backed the new approach fully. The
import licensing system was a huge source of discretionary power for the
commerce ministry, and Chidambaram’s willingness to give up this discretionary
power was absolutely critical for the success of the reforms. I recall that
officials in the finance ministry were not in favour of what they called
“liberalization of imports” at a time of a balance of payments stress. We
explained that since imports were being liberalized only against tradeable REP
licences (to be called Exim scrip later) which would be issued to exporters,
the total volume of imports through this window would be limited by the volume
of licences issued. There would be no balance of payments stress since any
excess demand for imports would lead to a larger premium on the licence which
would accrue to exporters. Fortunately, Manmohan Singh saw the logic of what we
were proposing, and backed it fully. Once the prime minister was assured that
both ministers favoured the change, he approved it in a single short meeting.
It was a remarkable example of quick decision-making at the political level.
There
was an interesting coincidence proceeding the big-bang reforms moment in 1991:
the coming together of a bunch of talented technocrats like you, almost all of
whom were lateral inductions. More recently, this phenomenon has faded.
You
are absolutely right about the usefulness of bringing in what you call
technocrats into government. Our civil service system works in such a way that
almost all top jobs are filled only by people from the services. Fortunately
for me, when I joined government in 1979, economists at least had an avenue for
lateral recruitment, because the various posts of economic adviser in different
ministries were not “cadre posts” of the Indian Economic Service. They were
filled by open competition in which internal candidates who were eligible could
be considered, but they had to compete with outsiders. There were many
economists such as Bimal Jalan, Vijay Joshi, Vijay Kelkar, Shankar Acharya,
Rakesh Mohan, Jayanta Roy and Arvind Virmani who joined the government in this
way. In fact, Manmohan Singh himself was first brought in as economic adviser,
commerce!
This
route was closed later because the economic adviser position was encadred so it
could only be filled internally from the Indian Economic Service. The Indian
Economic Service felt that just as IAS (Indian Administrative Service) officers
had a presumptive claim to certain top jobs, they should have no less. The comparison
was a valid one, but personally, I feel we need more flexibility in general for
all posts so that technocrats of different types, not just economists, can be
brought into government at senior levels.
Isn’t
it a fact that while the big-bang moment happened in 1991, there was
considerable heavy lifting in the previous decade beginning with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan of 1981? Don’t you think that this
altered the intellectual discourse of the country, inspiring a shift away from
socialism and allowing greater play to market forces?
I
have said that many steps were taken in the 1980s but interestingly, the 1981
IMF programme was not particularly market-oriented. Of course it had a little
bit of fiscal discipline, but we persuaded the IMF that we were going to manage
the balance of payments by expanding capacity in a number of sectors, and much
of that was through public investment! In fact, in retrospect, it is clear that
the 1981 programme succeeded not because of any of the things we proposed in
the programme but because we had a bonanza in offshore oil production from
Bombay High, much beyond what was originally expected.
The
1980s did see some relaxations in industrial policy but they were essentially
incremental. There was a more relaxed attitude towards import of foreign
technology and also a willingness to grant larger capacities to the private
sector. But that left the system of industrial and trade controls in place. The
real systemic changes came in 1991.
What
would have happened if the country had failed to generate the desired political
consensus and India had defaulted?
A
government default would have closed off all avenues of capital flow including
NRI (non-resident Indian) remittances and also interrupted borrowing from the
World Bank. It would have forced the government to impose even stricter
controls on imports, which would have damaged the economy and worsened the
domestic supply situation, leading to shortages and inflation. Countries that
have defaulted have taken a very long time to get back to normalcy.
Looking
back, do you believe that some sort of political consensus on economic reforms
has evolved over the last few decades? Where the United Progressive Alliance
(UPA) left off, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) seems to have begun.
I
have said earlier that we have developed a strong consensus for weak reforms.
One of the strengths of our system is that it does manage to develop a
political consensus. Political parties strongly oppose a policy when in
opposition, but they do not roll it back when in power, and even manage to take
it forward. The 1991 reforms were not rolled back by the United Front
government and were actually carried forward. The NDA government under (Atal
Bihari) Vajpayee also moved the reforms forward. Similarly, many of the reforms
that were in various stages in the pipeline under the UPA are being pushed
forward by the present government.
No
government will say that it is doing the same thing as its predecessor. It
would like to say it is doing something different which will yield better
results. That is understandable, but investors recognize that there are no
disruptive reversals and regard it as a strength of the Indian system. However,
they naturally feel frustrated that if there is that much underlying
continuity, why is it not possible to move faster? I think this is a fair point
and we need to ponder why this is so.
What
would you do differently if you had a chance?
I
think the broad directions of reforms, and the coverage of sectors identified
as needing reforms, were absolutely correct. However, I do feel we should have
done what we have in half the time and been further ahead on the things that
are still in the pipeline. I am not sure what I personally could have done
differently to achieve this objective. Perhaps more effort should have been
made to explain the benefits already emerging from the reforms, and use that as
the reason for moving more quickly to the next stage.
The
problem with gradualism is that it becomes confused with reform by stealth, or
doing things when the political environment is conducive. There was a very
active debate on policy issues in 1991. There has been much less of it in
recent years. Public attention is easily focused on whatever is sensational.
This means we always know what is wrong and that is a good thing. Hopefully,
the deficiencies highlighted will be corrected. But there is less reasoned
debate on what policy options the government has, and what it should do. As a
result, the government is always under pressure to do better but never under
pressure to take specific steps to achieve this result.
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